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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 26, 1967

SUBJECT: FRG Views On Non-Proliferation Treaty

PARTICIPANTS: Gunther Diehl, Director of Planning, FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Samuel De Palma, Asst. Director, ACDA/IR

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S - The Secretary

G - Mr. Kohler

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In the course of a relatively brief conversation, Mr. Diehl spoke largely of FRG concerns over the non-proliferation treaty. He said a main issue was the nature of any understanding regarding the treaty's bearing on a future united Europe. He said there may be a need for some official US statement to the FRG expressing our understanding. Perhaps it would also be necessary for the US and/or the FRG to say something publicly. He noted the problem posed for the FRG by the sharply contradictory interpretative statements emanating from Soviet sources and said it was difficult for his government to check the impulse to ascertain Soviet views more directly. He implied this would not be desirable since it would amount to an exercise in "black propaganda".

Mr. Diehl said that, subject to further discussions still pending in Bonn, he thought the FRG would accept a non-proliferation treaty after some further clarifications. Among the "embellishments" he thought his government would like to see in the treaty were the inclusion in the preamble of appropriate language:

a) Expressing the intention of the nuclear powers to limit and reduce their nuclear forces;

b) Making clear that the treaty would not be "abused" to

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restrict the exchange of non-military technology and the peaceful applications of atomic energy by non-nuclear weapon states; and ✓

c) stressing that nuclear powers are not to threaten or blackmail non-nuclear states. W

With respect to (b) above, he emphasized the serious concern in Germany that the treaty would further restrict the capability of Germany industry to stay abreast of modern technology. He mentioned in passing that the concern was somehow related to certain commercial practices of US industry abroad, but did not elaborate.

As regards point (c) above, he made clear that the FRG is not thinking of incorporating the Kossygin non-use formula as such in the preamble, but some more general formulation that would help allay the concerns of the non-aligned countries.

I told him that we were very much aware of the need to formulate a preamble which would meet the concerns of the non-nuclear and non-aligned countries and that one reason we had not yet circulated preambular language was that we wanted first to hear the suggestions of our allies. I noted, however, that some formulations desired by the non-aligned were likely to prove unacceptable to the Soviets and others might prove difficult for both the US and the Soviets. Mr. Diehl said in this connection that they had concluded in Bonn that there are almost insuperable difficulties in trying to devise any general assurance or guarantee for a non-proliferation treaty.

Mr. Diehl also said there ought to be further consideration of the bearing of a non-proliferation treaty on the ABM question, and specifically on possible future European desires for ABMs should they be deployed in the US. He speculated that a review of the treaty might be in order in that event, but admitted that German thinking regarding ABMs was "not very far advanced".

In conclusion, he said that the concept of a non-proliferation

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treaty of indefinite duration causes concern, as does the review clause. He did not have time to elaborate these points before he had to leave for another appointment.

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